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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 32Abstract
We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what mone-
tary authorities claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) and the poor
stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is
that central banks should be viewed as following ‘Calvo-type’ inﬂation-forecast-based
(IFB) interest rate rules which depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates
of inﬂation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks, and
potentially mimicking central bankers’ practice. We ﬁnd that Calvo-type IFB inter-
est rate rules are ﬁrst: less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a ﬁnite
forward horizon. Second, for such rules in diﬀerence form, the indeterminacy problem
disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as
they become more forward-looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard
IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known
estimated DSGE model of the Euro-area.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
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All modern central banks stress the importance of forward-looking policy and many 
the notion that interest rates should be based on future inflation expectations. The 
basis for such ‘forecast-based’ rules is that, by anchoring expectations, they improve 
the credibility and transparency of monetary policy as well as allowing policy to be 
pre-emptive. However, one concern is that typical forward-looking monetary policy 
rules (such as Taylor-type rules) may to lead to real indeterminacy which implies that 
when a shock displaces the economy from its equilibrium, there are an infinite 
number of possible paths for the real variables leading back to equilibrium. Such 
‘sunspot equilibria’ are of interest because sunspot fluctuations – i.e. persistent 
movements in inflation and output that materialize even in the absence of shocks to 
preferences or technology – are typically welfare reducing and potentially quite large. 
Whether policy rules lead to real indeterminacy depends on whether feedback 
parameters are insufficiently, or indeed overly, aggressive as well as depending on the 
length of the forecast horizon itself.   
 
Consequently, there would appear to an interesting puzzle in monetary economics 
between what policy makers claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) 
and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. The 
purpose of this paper is to suggest a resolution. We propose viewing central banks as 
following ‘Calvo-type’ inflation-forecast-based interest rate rules which depend on a 
discounted sum of current and all future rates of inflation. Such rules, it turns out, are 
less prone to indeterminacy than standard ones with a finite forward horizon and, if 
formulated in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. 
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June 2006Indeed, we show that optimized Calvo-type rules have good stabilization properties as 
they become more forward-looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard 
IFB rules. Finally, when taken to the data, Calvo-type monetary policy rules appear to 
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All modern central banks stress the importance of forward-looking policy and many the
notion that interest rates should be based on future inﬂation expectations. Well-known
examples include the central banks of Canada and New Zealand but this is also true by
implication of the practice of other central banks as well. For example, the monetary policy
strategy of the European Central Bank states that “price stability is to be maintained over
the medium term”, (ECB (1999), p. 47) which precisely suggests a forward-looking non-
inﬂationary strategy. The basis for inﬂation ‘forecast-based’ rules is that, by anchoring
expectations, they improve the credibility and transparency of monetary policy as well as
allowing policy to be pre-emptive. However, such rules have been criticized on various
fronts. One concerns the result that typical forward-looking monetary policy rules (such
as Taylor-type rules) tend to lead to real indeterminacy (Woodford (2003), chapter 4).
This implies that when a shock displaces the economy from its equilibrium, there are an
inﬁnite number of possible paths for the real variables leading back to equilibrium. Such
‘sunspot equilibria’ are of interest because sunspot ﬂuctuations – i.e. persistent movements
in inﬂation and output that materialize even in the absence of shocks to preferences or
technology – are typically welfare reducing and potentially quite large. Whether policy
rules lead to real indeterminacy depends on whether feedback parameters are insuﬃciently,
or indeed overly, aggressive as well as depending on the length of the forecast horizon itself
(Levin et al. (2003), Batini and Pearlman (2002), and Batini et al (2004a, b)).
Consequently, there would appear to an interesting puzzle in monetary economics
between what policy makers claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) and
the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. The purpose
of this paper is to suggest a resolution. We propose viewing central banks as following
‘Calvo-type’ inﬂation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules which depend on a discounted
sum of current and all future rates of inﬂation. Such rules, it turns out, are less prone
to indeterminacy than standard ones with a ﬁnite forward horizon and, if formulated
in diﬀerence form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Indeed, we show
that optimized Calvo-type rules have good stabilization properties as they become more
forward-looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Finally,
when taken to the data, they appear to behave at least as well as and sometimes better
than more standard monetary-policy reaction function.
Abstracting from such technical characteristics, moreover, the Calvo-type rules we
examine might also be regarded as both within the legal framework of, and potentially
mimicking central bankers’ practice. Such rules, however, raise the following tension.
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nication strategies to forward-looking outcomes. On the other, we further know that
forward-looking policy rules are susceptible to indeterminacy. Central banks, moreover,
themselves generate expectations for future-dated outcomes but do so in a chronically
uncertain environment. Accordingly, we might conjecture that whilst policy makers will
want to incorporate forecasts into their decision strategies, they may be reluctant to treat
them commensurate with realized outcomes. This “chronically uncertain environment”
faced by policy makers takes many forms. Consider a few examples.
First, macroeconomic time series tend to be actively revised in the quarters following
their publication; thus, rule-based policy prescriptions derived from realized data may de-
part signiﬁcantly from its real-time counterpart (e.g. Orphanides (2001)). It goes without
saying that forecasting in such a ‘noisy’ data environment complicates the policy pro-
cess considerably; authorities might then take recourse to contemporaneous or backward-
looking rules, or else persevere with strategies that explicitly incorporate but potentially
downplay (i.e., discount) forward-looking information.
Second, and more fundamentally, central-banks often employ strong conditioning as-
sumptions in these very forecasts such as constant projections of ﬁnancial variables, shock
processes and external assumptions. Potentially, therefore, forecasts (particularly medium-
term ones) might be considered more a benchmark for scenario analysis and discussion
than a speciﬁc expected outturn. In line with this, forecasts are often wrapped around
conﬁdence intervals or “fan-charts” whose widths are necessarily increasing in the forecast
horizon. Moreover, with every new forecast round, data, assumptions, expert judgment
and risks are updated such that ‘forecasts’ may themselves be heavily revised over time
and diﬀer markedly across institutions (e.g., Artis and Marcellino (2001)). Again, in such
circumstances, central banks may wish to incorporate these forecasts in their informa-
tion set and policy strategy but weigh them accordingly. Similarly, one might consider
other germane examples based on the various forms of model and judgmental uncertainty
(e.g., Onatski and Stock (2002), Svensson (2005)) and its consequences for attenuated or
non-attenuated policy making.
Summing up we might say that whilst forward-looking policies require forecasts, the
very nature of the policy process – i.e., forecast and judgmental revisions, real-time data
problems, model uncertainty etc – constrains policy makers to treat such information in a
manner diﬀerent from realized outcomes. Our solution – to think of policy as a Calvo-type
IFB rule – though simple, is quite powerful: policy makers target future outcomes (such as
future inﬂation rates) in a geometrically discounted manner. We show that this precludes
indeterminacy for a number of cases and, indeed, appears potentially data coherent when
8
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appended to an estimated DSGE model.The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out a model chosen for its tractability and
summarizes the analytical ﬁndings of the literature on IFB rules in their standard form.
In the analysis we focus exclusively on ‘pure’ inﬂation targeting without a feedback on the
output gap. We do this for two reasons: ﬁrst, the problems associated with measuring the
output gap and therefore implementing rules of the ‘Taylor’ type. Second since simplicity
per se is regarded as a positive aspect of monetary rules, it is of interest to study the
stabilizing performance of rules which are indeed as simple and transparent as possible.
The new contribution to the IFB literature is in section 3 which provides results for ‘Calvo-
type’ interest rate rules. Section 4 illustrates the relative empirical performance of our
chosen rule when incorporated into the well known Smets-Wouters DSGE model of the
euro area. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Previous Results for IFB Rules
We adopt a standard New Keynesian model popularized notably by Clarida et al. (1999)
and Woodford (2003).
πt = βEtπt+1 + λmct (1)
mct = −(1 + φ)at + σct + φyt (2)
ct = Etct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) (3)
yt = cyct + gygt (4)
at = ρaat−1 + ǫa,t (5)
gt = ρggt−1 + ǫg,t (6)
In (1) and (3), πt is the inﬂation rate, β is the private sector’s discount factor, Et(·) is the
expectations operator, yt is output, ct is consumption and the slope of the Phillips curve
λ can be expressed in terms of the average contract length of Calvo-type price contracts.
mct given by (2) is the marginal cost, where at is a technology shock and φ is the Frisch
parameter. (1) is derived as a linearized form of staggered price setting about a zero-
inﬂation steady state and (3) is a linearized Euler equation with it the nominal interest
rate and σ the risk aversion parameter. (4) is a linearized aggregate equilibrium relation
where gt is a government spending shock and cy and gy are consumption and government
spending shares respectively, in the steady state. According to (5) and (6), shocks follow
AR(1) processes. All variables are expressed as deviations about the steady state, πt and
it as absolute deviations and ct, yt and gt as proportional deviations.
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monetary-policy literature is the well-known Taylor (1993) rule, a generalized version of
which is,
ρ ∈ [0,1) : it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)
£
π∗
t + θπEt(πt+j − π∗
t+j) + θyEt(yt+k − ˆ yt+k)
¤
ρ = 1 : it = it−1 + [ΘπEt(πt+j − π∗
t) + ΘyEt(yt+k − ˆ yt+k)] (7)
where it is the nominal interest rate, πt is inﬂation over the interval [t−1,t], ˆ y is potential
output, yt actual output so y− ˆ yt is the ‘output gap’. Variables it, ˆ yt and yt are measured
in deviation form about a zero-inﬂation state-state and π∗
t is the inﬂation target. Integers
j,k are the policymaker’s forecast horizons, which is a feedback on single-period inﬂation
over the interval [t + j − 1,t + j] and a feedback on the output gap over the period t + k.
Thus, this speciﬁcation of an interest rate rule accommodates not only ‘outcome-based’
rules (j,k ≤ 0) but also ‘forecast-based’ ones (with j,k > 0). Finally, θπ,θy > 0 and
Θπ,Θy > 0 are feedback parameters: the larger are the values of these parameters, the
faster is the pace at which the central bank acts to eliminate the gap between expected
inﬂation and the expected output gap and their target values.
The parameter ρ ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. If ρ = 1 we
have an integral (or diﬀerence) rule that is equivalent to the interest rate responding to
a price-level target.1 For ρ < 1, (7) can be written as ∆it =
1−ρ
ρ [θπEt(πt+j − π∗
t+j) +
θyEt(yt+k − ˆ yt+k)−it] which is a partial adjustment to a static IFB rule it = θπEt(πt+j −
π∗
t+j) + θyEt(yt+k − ˆ yt+k).
For reasons already discussed our analysis focuses on standard IFB rules without an
output gap target (θy = 0) and with a zero inﬂation target π∗
t = 0.2 Then writing θπ ≡ θ
and Θπ ≡ Θ, (7) becomes
it = ρit−1 + θ(1 − ρ)Etπt+j ; ρ ∈ [0,1), θ > 0
= it−1 + ΘEtπt+j ; ρ = 1, Θ > 0 (8)
Stability and indeterminacy of a dynamic system are associated with the roots of the
system’s characteristic equation, or equivalently, the eigenvalues of its state-space setup.
If the number of unstable roots (outside the unit circle) exactly matches the number of
1Unlike its non-integral counterpart, an integral rule responding to inﬂation does not require observa-
tions of the steady state (natural) rate of interest, about which it is expressed, to implement. The merits
of price-level versus inﬂation targeting are examined in Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2003).
2Another form of IFB rule found in the literature targets average inﬂation over a speciﬁed time horizon,





1+j . As indicated after result 4 below, these rules roughly have the same determinacy
properties as a standard IFB rule with half the horizon j.
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leads to indeterminacy, while too many leads to instability.
The mechanism through which indeterminacy arises can be illustrated in the context
of a simpliﬁed version of our model. On the demand side, we replace the Keynes-Ramsey
condition (3) with an ad hoc IS curve yt = −α(it−Etπt+1), and assume yt = ct and β = 1.
Moreover, suppose that the central bank employs a non-integral rule without interest rate
smoothing (ρ = 0) so that (7) becomes it = θEtπt+1. Substituting out for yt and it we
arrive at the following process for inﬂation
Et(πt+1) =
1
1 − λα(θ − 1)
πt (9)
Consider the case in which private sector expectations are driven by a non-fundamental
shock process and anticipate that inﬂation next period will be equal to 1. This will lead
to an increase in real interest rates, with a consequent reduction in demand of α(θ − 1).
Given (9), price-setting behaviour will thus imply a current inﬂation rate of 1−λα(θ−1),
which we deﬁne as π0.
Now assume that θ is chosen so that 0 < π0 < 1, which is the case if 1+1/(λα) > θ > 1.
If we then lead equation (9) forward in time and take expectations, consistency requires
that the sequence of successive inﬂationary expectations is given by 1,1/π0,1/π2
0,1/π3
0,....
However, these inﬂation expectations tend to inﬁnity – a solution that clashes with private-
sector expectations. Thus, the unique possible solution is πt = yt = it = 0 for all t > 0. On
the other hand, suppose that the central bank is not aggressive, and θ < 1. In this case,
π0 > 1, and hence the sequence of inﬂationary expectations tends to zero – a solution that
fulﬁls private-sector expectations making these ‘self-fulﬁlling’. Now suppose the central
bank is over-aggressive such that π0 < −1. This happens when θ > 1+ 2
λα. In this case, the
economy experiences cycles of positive and negative inﬂation but again the sequence of in-
ﬂationary expectations tends to zero and fulﬁls private-sector expectations. Self-fulﬁlling
expectations implies that any initial private-sector expectation leads to an acceptable path
for inﬂation – hence indeterminacy. Furthermore, if these (non-fundamental) shocks to
private-sector expectations follow a stochastic process, then ‘sunspot equilibria’ are gener-
ated. These are typically welfare-reducing because they induce increased volatility in the
system.
The main results for this form of IFB rule from Batini and Pearlman (2002), Batini
et al. (2004) and Batini et al. (2006) can be summarized as follows:
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a necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability and determinacy. For higher
feedback horizons (j ≥ 1), Θ > 0 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
stability and determinacy.
Result 2: For j-period ahead integral IFB rules, j ≥ 1, there exists a range
Θ ∈ [0, ¯ Θ(j)] with ¯ Θ(j) > 0 such that the model is stable and determinate.
Result 3: For a non-integral rule feeding back on current inﬂation (j = 0),
θ > 1 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability and determinacy. For
higher feedback horizons (j ≥ 1), θ > 1 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condi-
tion for stability and determinacy.
Result 4: For j-period ahead non-integral IFB rules, j ≥ 1, there exists some









To get a feel for these results we now provide numerical values for threshold values ¯ θ
for non-integral rules and ¯ Θ for integral rules. In Figure 1, based on Table 1, parameter
estimates are taken from Batini et al. (2006).4 For non-integral rules we set ρ = 0.8.
Threshold ρ j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 6
¯ θ(j) 0.8 102 12 3.4 1.7 1.0 indeterminacy
¯ Θ(j) 1 23 3.6 1.2 0.68 0.46 0.34
Table 1. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) and ¯ Θ(j).
These numerical results corroborate the analytical results summarized above. The
indeterminacy problem becomes more acute as the horizon j increases imposing a tighter
constraint on the range of IFB rules available. For non-integral rules with ρ = 0.8, the
maximum horizon J is just over 5 quarters. In accordance with result 2, for integral rules
3Strictly, there are some mild conditions on the parameters that a plausible calibration easily satisﬁes
for this result to hold – see Batini and Pearlman (2002). For the average inﬂation rule of the type set out
in the previous footnote, the corresponding lead ˆ J is given by ˆ J = 2J − 1
4Parameter values are: λ = 0.27, β = 0.99, σ = 3.91, φ = 2.16, ρa = ρg = 0.9, sd(ǫg) = 2.75,
sd(ǫa) = 0.59 found using Bayesian methods and US data. It should be noted we choose this simple
NK model for its tractability: alternative variants with consumption and inﬂation persistence mechanisms
greatly improved the ﬁt of the model and were preferred in the Bayesian sense.
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 643
















UPPER BOUND FOR Θ 
UPPER BOUND 
  FOR θ(1  ρ) 
A 
B 
C  D 
E 
F 
θ(1  ρ)=0.2 
Figure 1: Critical Upper Bounds for (1 − ρ)θ and Θ.
as j increases there is always some feedback coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation 0 < Θ < ¯ Θ
such that the IFB rule yields stability and determinacy. For non-integral rules the area
of determinacy in (j,(1−ρ)θ) space is EFC. For integral rules the corresponding space in
(j,Θ) space is ABDC.5
3 Calvo-Type Interest Rate Rules
We now turn to the main focus of this paper, which is on an alternative way of thinking
about IFB rules, referred to in the Introduction as Calvo-type interest rate rules.6 To
formulate this ﬁrst deﬁne the discounted sum of future expected inﬂation rates as
Θt = (1 − ϕ)Et(πt + ϕπt+1 + ϕ2πt+2 + · · ·); ϕ ∈ (0,1) (11)
5Further insight into these results can be provided by writing the expected value of future inﬂation
approximately as Etπt+j = (λ
max)
jπt where λ
max is the largest stable eigenvalue of the system under
control. Then as j increases, (λ
max)
j decreases, so that the feedback eﬀect becomes negligible, and the
system exhibits indeterminacy similar to the θ < 1 type.
6We use this terminology since they have the same structure as Calvo-type price or wage contracts.
(Calvo (1983)). One can think of the rule as a feedback from expected future inﬂation which continues in
any one period with probability ϕ and is switched oﬀ with probability 1 − ϕ. The probability of the rule
lasting for just j periods is then (1−ϕ)ϕ
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ϕEtΘt+1 − Θt = −(1 − ϕ)πt (12)
With this deﬁnition, a rule of the form
it = ρit−1 + θ(1 − ρ)Θt ; ρ ∈ [0,1), θ > 0
= it−1 + ΞΘt ; ρ = 1, Ξ > 0 (13)
emerges which describes feedback on forward-looking inﬂation with mean lead horizon
ϕ
1−ϕ. Thus with ϕ = 0.5, for example, we have a Calvo-type rule that compares with (7)
with a horizon j = 1.
Consider ﬁrst non-integral rules. With a Calvo-type rule, writing (1), (3), (12) and
(13) in matrix form, the characteristic equation of the system can be shown to be
(1 − ϕz)(z − ρ)((βz − 1)(z − 1) −
λ
σ
z) + θ(1 − ϕ)(1 − ρ)
λ
σ
z = 0 (14)
where z is the forward operator (i.e., zxt ≡ xt+1). Noting that the system (1), (3) and
(13) has only one lag term, the condition for stability and indeterminacy of the system is
that exactly one root of (14) must lie within the unit circle. Accordingly, we investigate
(14) using the root locus method.7 The root locus diagram for (14) is shown Figure 2,
which depicts the complex plane, and is a generic shape for all parameter values of the
system. The root locus starts out at the roots of (14) for θ = 0; these roots are denoted on
the diagram by •. Note that one root, z = 1/ϕ, is outside the unit circle, while another,
z = ρ is inside the unit circle, and it is easy to show that (βz − 1)(z − 1) − λ
σz = 0 has
one root outside and one root inside the unit circle. The arrows then show how the four
roots change as θ changes. Note in particular that the smallest root has a branch from it
leading to z = 0, while the largest has a branch leading to z = ∞. Of the other two roots,
one of them has a branch passing through z = 1, and where their branches meet, they
both branch into the complex plane and head to inﬁnity at an angle of 60◦ asymptotically
to the real line.8
There are several things to note about this root locus diagram. First when θ = 1, then
z = 1 as well; this is immediate from (14).9 Second, the diagram therefore implies that
the system has a single stable root for all values of θ > 1, no matter what are the other
parameter values. However this apparently general result needs some explanation, and
7See Appendix A for a brief guide to the root-locus method.
8The root locus diagram would look qualitatively the same if 1/ϕ were the largest real root, or ρ the
smallest real root for θ = 0.
9Note that the Taylor principle, that interest rate should react by more than one-to-one to expected or
current or past inﬂation means that θ > 1 for non-integral rules.
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Figure 2: Position of Zeroes as θ Changes from 0 to ∞.
indeed some slight qualiﬁcation. We summarise the main results as follows, and provide
a proof in Appendix B:
Result 5
A suﬃcient condition for the system (1)-(3) with the Calvo interest rate rule
(13) to be determinate for all θ > 1 is that ρ > ϕ.
Estimated interest-rate rules (including our estimates in section 5) suggest substantial
smoothing with typically ρ > 0.95. The condition in this last result is therefore that
ϕ < 0.95 or in other words the mean lag must be less than 19 quarters. A ﬁnal observa-
tion is that as the interest rate smoothing increases, at the limit where we have an integral
rule, result 5 always holds. Thus the result for integral (price-level) rules is an immediate
corollary of Result 5.
Result 6
The system (1)-(3) with the Calvo integral (i.e., price-level) interest rate rule
is determinate for all Ξ > 0.
The proof follows once one has replaced (1 − ρ)θ by Ξ, so that the same argument
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context of our simple model) if the authorities target a weighted average of present and
future price levels with geometrically declining weights.
The Calvo IFB rule (13) is not completely forward-looking as it includes a reaction to
current inﬂation with weight unity. Does the improved determinacy properties of this rule
compared with standard IFB rules crucially depend on the presence of current inﬂation?10
We can see this is not the case because average inﬂation rules, which also react to current
inﬂation over a ﬁnite time horizon j referred to in footnotes 2 and 3, have similar indeter-
minacy properties to single-period IFB rules with horizon
j+1
2 if j is odd and
j
2 if even.
Further suppose that the Calvo rule involves only forward-looking inﬂation, so that (12)
contains the term Etπt+1 instead of πt, so that the characteristic equation (14) becomes
(1 − ϕz)(z − ρ)((βz − 1)(z − 1) −
λ
σ
z) + θ(1 − ϕ)(1 − ρ)
λ
σ
z2 = 0 (15)
One can show using the root locus technique, that provided ρ > ϕ, there is indeterminacy
only for values of θ beyond that value at which z = −1. Thus the critical value of θ for
indeterminacy is that which satisﬁes (15) at z = −1. It is easy to see that this critical value
is given by f(ρ)(1+ϕ)/(1−ϕ), where f(ρ) is a function of ρ (and the other parameters),
is an increasing function of ϕ. Thus for the Calvo-rule as ϕ and therefore the expected
horizon increases, the proneness to indeterminacy actually falls. Furthermore the function
f(ρ) → ∞ as ρ → 1, so with Calvo integral rules that are purely forward-looking, the
critical value for θ above which there is indeterminacy becomes inﬁnite and result 6 holds.
We end this section by noting the contrast between Result 5 and Result 3, which can
be illustrated by the root locus diagrams of Figure 3 for IFB rules. These depict the cases
for interest rates depending on either (a) inﬂation 3 periods ahead, or (b) average inﬂation
over the current period, and up to 3 periods ahead. Both these demonstrate that there
may be a range of θ > 1 for which there is determinacy (exactly one stable root), but for
θ too large, there is indeterminacy.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
4.1 Utility-Based Welfare
In the simple model of this paper a quadratic approximation to the utility of the household














10We are grateful to an anonymous ECB working paper referee for posing this question.
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Figure 3: Position of Zeroes for (a) forward-looking rules (b) average forward-
looking rules as θ Changes from 0 to ∞.






(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)(σ + φ)
(17)
In (17), 1 − ξ is probability of a price optimization for each ﬁrm, σ is the risk aversion
parameter, 1 + φ is the elasticity of disutility with respect to hours worked and ζ is
the elasticity of substitution of diﬀerentiated goods making up aggregate output.11 For
estimated or calibrated parameter values reported in Batini et al. (2006), this gives wπ =
1.826. Based on an annual inﬂation rate this is equivalent to wπ = 1.826
16 = 0.11 which is
at the lower end of commonly used weights.
4.2 Optimal Policy with and without Commitment
We ﬁrst compute the optimal policies where the policy maker can commit, and the optimal
discretionary policy where no commitment mechanism is in place. To obtain the weight on
interest rate variance, wi, we ﬁrst compute the optimal commitment rule with the interest
rate responding only to current inﬂation (see below). We impose an approximate zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate by experimenting with wi so it is suﬃciently
high so as to ensure it > 0 with almost unit probability 0.99%; i.e., (assuming a normal
distribution), sd(it) < i
2.33 where i = ( 1
β −1)×100 is the natural rate of interest. A weight
wi = 0.5 was necessary to achieve this condition.
11See Woodford (2003), chapter 6.
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We now turn to optimized IFB rules. The general form of the rule that covers both integral
and non-integral rules is given by
it = ρit−1 + ΞEtπt+j ; ρ ∈ [0,1], Ξj ≥ 0 (18)
The corresponding Calvo-type rules are given by
it = ρit−1 + ΞEtΘt ; ρ ∈ [0,1], Ξ, j ≥ 0 (19)
Given the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the white noise disturbances, an
optimal combination (Ξ,ρ) can be found for each rule deﬁned by the time horizon j ≥ 0.
4.4 Numerical Results
We ﬁrst focus on the optimal commitment rule, the optimal discretionary (time-consistent)
rule and an optimized current inﬂation rule. Results for the three types of rules are sum-
marized in table 2. Figures 4-11 compare the responses under the three rules following an
an unanticipated productivity shock (a0 = 1) and an unanticipated government spending
shock (g0 = 1). The output and inﬂation equivalent welfare diﬀerences compared with the
optimal commitment policy are computed as follows. Suppose the welfare loss diﬀerence
is X. This is equivalent to a permanent output gap of ye if 1
2(1−β)y2
e = X, and to a
permanent inﬂationary bias of πe if 1
2(1−β)bπ2
e = X; i.e.,
ye =
p






Comparing the three types of rules, there are two notable results that. First, Clarida
et al. (1999) stress the existence of stabilization gains from commitment in New-Keynesian
models: we show that in our simple model that these are substantial, amounting to an
permanent output equivalent of 1.02% or an inﬂationary bias of 0.75% per quarter or 3%
per year. The source of this time-inconsistency problem is from pricing and consumption
behaviour together. Following a shock which diverts the economy from its steady state,
given expectations of inﬂation, the opportunist policy-maker can increase or decrease
output by reducing or increasing the interest rate which increases or decreases inﬂation.
Consider the case where the economy is below its steady-state level of output. A reduction
in the interest rate then causes consumption demand to rise. Firms who are locked into
price contracts respond to an increase in demand by increasing output and increasing
the price according to their indexing rule. Those who can re-optimize only increase their
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to inﬂate when the output gap increases. In a non-commitment equilibrium, however, the
incentive is anticipated and the result is greater inﬂation variability as compared with the
commitment case. This contrast between the commitment and discretionary cases is seen
clearly in the ﬁgures.
The second notable results concerns the optimized current inﬂation rule. We ﬁnd that
most of the gains from commitment (in fact over 80%) can be achieved by this very simple
optimized rule without an output gap feedback and the cost of simplicity is only 0.11% of
output or an inﬂationary bias of 0.08 per quarter or 0.32% per year. In the ﬁgures we see
how the optimized current inﬂation rule closely mimics the optimal commitment rule.
Rule ρ Ξ Loss Function ye πe
Minimal Feedback on πt 1 0.001 49.01 0.97 0.72
IFB0 1 2.035 2.509 0.11 0.08
IFB1 1 12.00 2.676 0.12 0.09
IFB2 1 3.570 4.574 0.23 0.17
IFB3 1 1.216 32.02 0.78 0.57
IFB4 1 0.675 208.1 2.03 1.50
Calvo IFB(ϕ = 0.5) 1 2.203 2.602 0.12 0.09
Calvo IFB(ϕ = 0.67) 1 2.351 2.636 0.12 0.09
Calvo IFB(ϕ = 0.75) 1 2.444 2.653 0.12 0.09
Calvo IFB(ϕ = 0.875) 1 2.616 2.678 0.13 0.09
Calvo IFB(ϕ = 0.917) 1 2.683 2.689 0.13 0.09
Optimal Commitment n.a. n.a 1.896 0 0
Optimal Discretion n.a. n.a 53.55 1.02 0.75
Table 2. Welfare-Based Optimal Rules and Optimized IFB Rules Compared.
Turning now to IFB rules we compute the optimized standard rules with future horizon
j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, denoted by IFBj and compare these with Calvo rules with probability
of survival ϕ = 0.5, 0.67, 0.75, 0.875 and 0.917 corresponding to an average future horizon
of
ϕ
1−ϕ = 1, 2, 4, 7 and 11 quarters respectively. Our results ﬁrst conﬁrm a ﬁnding of
Batini et al. (2006): that the stabilization performance of standard optimized IFBj rules
deteriorates sharply as the horizon j increases. Our new result that follows from the
stability analysis of Calvo-type rules and the absence of an ‘indeterminacy constraint’ is
that this sharp deterioration is not a feature of Calvo-type optimized IFB rules. Even
optimized rules with an expected future horizon of 3 years performs almost as well as the
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current inﬂation rule.5 Calvo-Interest Rate Rules: A DSGE Model Illustration
In this section, we implement the afore-mentioned Calvo interest rules in a benchmark
model of the euro area, namely that of Smets and Wouters (2003). First we provide a
brief description of the model.
5.1 The Smets-Wouters Model
The Smets-Wouters (SW) model in an extended version of the standard New-Keynesian
DSGE closed-economy model with sticky prices and wages estimated by Bayesian tech-
niques. The model features three types of agents: households, ﬁrms and the monetary
policy authority. Households maximize a utility function with two arguments (goods and
leisure) over an inﬁnite horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative
to a time-varying external habit-formation variable. Labour is diﬀerentiated over house-
holds, so that there is some monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit wage
equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal Calvo-type wages contracts.
Households also rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much to accumulate given
certain capital adjustment costs. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods, decide on labour
and capital inputs, and set Calvo-type price contracts. Wage and price setting is aug-
mented by the assumption that those prices and wages that can not be freely set are
partially indexed to past inﬂation. Prices are therefore set as a function of current and
expected real marginal cost, but are also inﬂuenced by past inﬂation. Real marginal cost
depends on wages and the rental rate of capital. The short-term nominal interest rate is
the instrument of monetary policy. The stochastic behaviour of the model is driven by ten
exogenous shocks: ﬁve arising from technology and preferences, three cost-push shocks
and two monetary-policy shocks. Consistent with the DSGE set up, potential output is
deﬁned as the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and wages in the
absence of cost-push shocks.
5.2 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
In line with the empirical approach to monetary rules in SW, we modify the monetary-
policy reaction functions for the standard and Calvo IFB rules as respectively,
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[¯ πt + θπEt(πt+j − ¯ πt+j) + θy˜ yt] + θ∆π(πt − πt−1) + θ∆y(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1)
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[¯ πt + θπΘt(ϕ) + θy˜ yt] + θ∆π(πt − πt−1) + θ∆y(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1) (22)
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back on lagged inﬂation. To incorporate this rule as a special case we also modify (11) to
become
Θt = (1 − ϕ)Et[πt−1 − π∗
t−1 + ϕ(πt − π∗
t) + ϕ2(πt+1 − π∗
t+1) + · · ·]; ϕ ∈ (0,1) (23)
so (12) now becomes
ϕEtΘt+1 − Θt = −(1 − ϕ)(πt−1 − π∗
t−1) (24)
This modiﬁed Calvo rule reduces to the past inﬂation rate rule in SW as a special case by
putting ϕ = 0. The mean lead horizon is now given by 1
1−ϕ − 2.12
5.3 Results
Thus, we re-estimate by Bayesian methods the SW model with the policy rule replaced
by (22) and the model supplemented with (23); where, to repeat, the special case of ϕ=0
retrieves the default, backward-looking SW policy rule.13 Table 3 reports the parameters
of the policy reaction function for each model variant, from IFB-1 to IFB4 to the Calvo
case.14 As standard, two sets of parameter results are presented. First, the estimated
posterior mode of the parameters, which is obtained by directly maximizing the log of the
posterior distribution with respect to the parameters (and a standard error based on the
corresponding Hessian). Second, the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution
of the parameters obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm (using
100,000 draws from the posterior, 3 parallel chains and an average acceptance rate of
around 0.25) for the various model variants. The models are estimated using the Dynare
software, Juillard (2004). Note, in re-estimation, we used identical priors to those used
in SW. For the additional parameter, ϕ moreover, we assumed a Beta distribution with a
prior mean of 0.8 (corresponding to a mean lead horizon of 3 quarters), with a standard
error of 0.1.
Turning to the results themselves, we see that the Calvo rule yields a ϕ value centred
at an implied mean lead horizon of 3 to 4 quarters in the policy rule. As shown in the
last row of Table 3 which reports the model odds, this rule beats all contemporaneous and
forecast-based rules in marginal likelihood terms without leading to any deterioration
12It is straightforward to show that the results of section 3 still hold with this modiﬁcation.
13We are grateful to Gregory De Walque and Raf Wouters for providing the SW model in Dynare code.
14Results for the other parameters (as well as the Dynare ﬁles to replicate our results) are available on
request from the authors. Notably, the full set of parameter values appeared very well identiﬁed and stable
across the model variants.
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ρ Mode 0.969 0.969 0.965 0.951 0.958
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021)
Mean 0.965 0.967 0.958 0.940 0.951
[0.943:0.984] [0.951:0.986] [0.932:0.983] [0.891:0.977] [0.918:0.982]
θπ Mode 1.700 1.701 1.700 1.700 1.702
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099)
Mean 1.697 1.698 1.700 1.703 1.707
[1.535:1.853] [1.531:1.860] [1.542:1.873] [1.541:1.867] [1.539:1.868]
θy Mode 0.121 0.121 0.117 0.111 0.120
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.045)
Mean 0.117 0.123 0.109 0.107 0.120
[0.045:0.186] [0.057:0.193] [0.034:0.178] [0.028:0.171] [0.053:0.186]
θ∆π Mode 0.146 0.146 0.111 0.118 0.121
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Mean 0.155 0.110 0.116 0.119 0.126
[0.070:0.239] [0.034:0.195] [0.034:0.200] [0.041:0.196] [0.048:0.212]
θ∆y Mode 0.154 0.154 0.152 0.147 0.151
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Mean 0.152 0.152 0.146 0.139 0.146
[0.120:0.191] [0.115:0.187] [0.112:0.183] [0.099:0.178] [0.109:0.181]
ϕ Mode - - - - 0.8398
- - - - (0.103)
Mean - - - - 0.797
- - - - [0.646:0.956]
Prob. 0.289 0.096 0.158 0.224 0.234
Table 3. Calvo and Standard IFB Rules Compared.
IFBj Rule: it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)[π∗
t +θπEt(πt+j −π∗
t+j)+θy˜ yt]+θ∆π(πt −πt−1)+θ∆y(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1)
Calvo IFB (ϕ): it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)[π∗
t +θπΘt(ϕ)+θy˜ yt]+θ∆π(πt −πt−1)+θ∆y(˜ yt − ˜ yt−1) where
ϕEtΘt+1 − Θt = −(1 − ϕ)(π−t − π∗
t−1). Hessian Standard errors are in parenthesis and 5th and
95th percentiles in squared brackets. Log marginal likelihood of IFB(-1) equals -298.65.
in the parameter values. Comparing the likelihood values of the Calvo rule with the
backward-looking, IFB (-1), rule there is clearly a very close data coherence. Indeed, in
terms of Bayesian odds ratio (0.234/0.289 = 0.81), we eﬀectively could not discriminate
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sive, these results do suggest that a Calvo-type rule is perfectly competitive with more
conventional monetary policy rules.
6 Conclusions
The large literature on IFB rules now strongly suggests that rules that target future inﬂa-
tion with a speciﬁed time horizon are prone to indeterminacy and have poor stabilization
properties. This raises an interesting puzzle of why many central banks insist on forward-
looking inﬂation targets. Our paper proposes a resolution of this puzzle by suggesting
that the policy process of central banks may in fact be best modelled in the form of a
Calvo-type rule that targets a discounted inﬁnite sum of future expected inﬂation.
Our main ﬁndings are ﬁrst: Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are less prone to indeter-
minacy than standard ones with a ﬁnite forward horizon. Second, for such rules in integral
(i.e., diﬀerence) form the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. In this case the
Calvo rule takes the form of a weighted average future price-level target with geometrically
declining weights. Third, as a consequence of these results, optimized Calvo-type rules
have good stabilization properties as they become more forward-looking, which sharply
contrasts with the substantial deterioration in the corresponding performance of standard
IFB rules. Fourth, in terms of data coherence in the context of the SW model, a Calvo-
type rule with a mean forward horizon of just less than one year is perfectly competitive
with more conventional monetary policy rules.
15As discussed in Geweke (1999), the Bayesian approach to estimation allows a formal comparison of
diﬀerent models based on their marginal likelihoods. The marginal likelihood of Model Mi is given by,
p(Y | Mi) =
Z
Ξ
p(ξ | Mi)p(Y | ξ,Mi)dξ
where p(ξ | Mi) is the prior density for model Mi and p(Y | ξ,Mi) is the data density for model Mi given
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Here we present a brief guide to how to use the root locus technique. We start by some
standard ‘rules’ as provided in control theory textbooks, and then apply them to the
speciﬁc example of the paper.
The idea is to track the roots of the polynomial equation f(z) + θg(z) = 0 as θ moves
from 0 to ∞. Clearly for θ = 0, the roots are those of f(z) = 0, whereas when θ → ∞,
the roots are those of g(z) = 0. The root locus then connects the ﬁrst set of roots to
the second set by a series of lines and curves. We shall assume without loss of generality
that the coeﬃcient of the highest power of f is negative and that of g is positive. Since
the roots of a polynomial may be complex, the root locus must be plotted in the complex
plane.
There are a number of diﬀerent ways of stating the standard ‘rules’ that underlie
the technique. One popular way (see Evans (1954)) of sketching the root locus by hand
involves just 6 steps:
1(a). Deﬁne n(f) = no. of zeros of f(z), n(g) = no. of zeros of g(z). For our case,
n(f) = 4,n(g) = 1.
1(b). Loci start at the zeros of f(z), and end at the zeros of g(z) and at ∞ if
n(f) > n(g).
2. Number of loci must be equal to max(n(f),n(g)) = 4, in our case.
3. A point on the real axis is on the root locus if the number of zeros of f and g on
the real axis to its left is odd.
4. Loci ending at ∞ do so at angles to the positive real axis given by 2kπ/(n(f)−n(g)),
where the integer k ranges from 0 to (n(f) − n(g)) − 1. In our case, these angles are
0, 2π/3, 4π/3.
5. If all coeﬃcients of f and g are real, then the root locus is symmetric about the
real axis.
6. Loci leave the real axis where ∂θ/∂z = 0.
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We prove this in two steps. Firstly, we need to show that the branch point into the complex
plane near to z = 1 is to the right of z = 1. Secondly, we have to show that the branches
of the root locus do not cross the unit circle twice (otherwise there are too many stable
roots over a certain range of values of θ greater than 1, and hence indeterminacy over this
range).
Step 1. The branch point is to the right of z = 1 provided that the root locus
passes through this point from left to right as θ increases. But this means that we require
∂z/∂θ > 0 at z = θ = 1. By implicit diﬀerentiation of (14) we ﬁnd that
[(1 − β)(1 − ρ)(1 − ϕ) +
λ
σ






= (1 − ρ)(1 − ϕ)
It is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for ∂z/∂θ
¯ ¯
θ=1 > 0 is ρ > ϕ.
Step 2. We now investigate those points on the root locus that lie on the unit circle.
These are of course characterized by z = eiφ = cosφ + isinφ. To solve for φ, the easiest
approach is to substitute z = eiφ directly, and then multiply (14) through by e−iφ. Then
the imaginary part of this expression is independent of θ, and can be written as
ϕβsin3φ−[β(1+ϕρ)+ϕ(1+β+λ/σ))]sin2φ+[(1+ϕρ)(1+β+λ/σ)+ϕ+ρβ−ρ]sinφ = 0
(B.1)
Using the substitutions sin2φ = 2sinφcosφ,sin3φ = (4cos2φ−1)sinφ, it is clear that one
solution to (B.1) is sinφ = 0, which corresponds to φ = 0 (z=1) and φ = π (z=-1, which
is technically a solution when θ < 0). It follows that the other solutions are given by
4ϕβcos2φ−2[β(1+ϕρ)+ϕ(1+β+λ/σ))]cosφ+(1+ϕρ)(1+β+λ/σ)+ϕ+ρβ−ρ−ϕβ = 0
Provided that ρ > ϕ, it is easy to show that the coeﬃcient of cosφ is more than twice that
of cos2φ; it follows that at least one of the solutions to cosφ is greater than 1. But this
means that there is no more than one real solution for φ, so that there cannot be a double
crossing of the unit circle for ρ > ϕ.
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CURRENT INFLATION RULE 
Figure 4: Inﬂation following Shock a0 = 1.













CURRENT INFLATION RULE 
 
Figure 5: Interest Rate following Shock a0 = 1.
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OPTIMAL  COMMITMENT AND CURRENT INFLATION RULE
TIME CONSISTENT 
Figure 6: Output following Shock a0 = 1.














CURRENT INFLATION RULE  
Figure 7: Output Gap following Shock a0 = 1.
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CURRENT INFLATION RULE  
OPTIMAL COMMITMENT 
Figure 8: Inﬂation following Shock g0 = 1.
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Figure 9: Interest Rate following Shock g0 = 1.
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AND CURREN INFLATION RULE      
 
Figure 10: Output following Shock g0 = 1.
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OPTIMAL COMMITMENT 
Figure 11: Output Gap following Shock g0 = 1.
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